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ABSTRACT 
 
Towards Privacy Preserving of Forensic DNA Databases. (December 2011) 
Sanmin Liu, B.S., Huazhong University of Science & Technology; 
M.E.,  Huazhong University of Science & Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jyh-Charn Liu 
 
Protecting privacy of individuals is critical for forensic genetics. In a kinship/identity 
testing, related DNA profiles between user’s query and the DNA database need to be 
extracted. However, unrelated profiles cannot be revealed to each other. The challenge is 
today’s DNA database usually contains millions of DNA profiles, which is too big to 
perform privacy-preserving query with current cryptosystem directly. In this thesis, we 
propose a scalable system to support privacy-preserving query in DNA Database. A two-
phase strategy is designed: the first is a Short Tandem Repeat index tree for quick 
fetching candidate profiles from disk. It groups loci of DNA profiles by matching 
probability, so as to reduce I/O cost required to find a particular profile. The second is an 
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem based privacy-preserving matching engine, which performs 
match between candidates and user’s sample. In particular, a privacy-preserving DNA 
profile matching algorithm is designed, which achieves Oሺ݊ሻ  computing time and 
communication cost. Experimental results show that our system performs well at query 
latency, query hit rate, and communication cost. For a database of one billion profiles, it 
takes 80 seconds to return results to the user.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays privacy concerns have become one of the most important security issues in 
many Internet applications. One of them is in the area of forensic science, which has 
experienced significant progress recently. In 1984, DNA Fingerprint was used to 
describe the analysis of polymorphic regions of DNA. In the following year, at the 
request of the United Kingdom Home office, DNA profiling was successfully applied to 
resolve an immigration dispute. The use of genetics was quickly adopted by the forensic 
community and plays an important role worldwide in the investigation of crime [1]. 
1.1 DNA Profiling 
A major research opportunity exists on how to develop a high efficient matching 
algorithm to support DNA database forensics, which will not suffer re-identification 
from malicious users. Here, we assume a query from a client is safe when1 only related 
DNA profiles between user and database could be learned by each other, without leaking 
whole content of unrelated profile to each other. Through partial value of a profile will 
be disclosed between client and server, it can still guarantee each individual’s privacy. 
Forensic genetics is a branch of genetics that deals with the application of genetic 
knowledge to legal problems and legal proceedings. Forensic genetics is also a branch of 
forensic medicine that deals more broadly with the application of medical knowledge to 
                                                      
The journal model is IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 
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legal matters [1]. Figure 1 describes the basic steps to identify criminal with forensic 
genetics. 
Short Tandem Repeats (STRs) are currently the most common technique used for 
DNA forensics. STR is a pattern of two or more nucleotides repeated and the repeated 
sequences are directly adjacent to each other. Typically, the core unit is between 1-6 
base pairs (bp), while the repeats range from 50-300bp. We call this repeat pattern allele, 
which is represented as a float number.  In human genomes, there are totally more than 
10,000 STR loci [Table III shown on page 41]. Due to a high polymorphism between 
individuals and strong stability across time, STR are used in many applications, 
including identification, parentage and kinship testing, genetic genealogy and answering 
historical questions, etc. 
 
Fig. 1.  Forensic genetics in identifying criminal 
 
Since the 1990s, many countries have setup national DNA profile databases to assist in 
the identification of suspect of crimes. Among these, the Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS) of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) contains over 
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6,300,000 offender profiles and 241,000 forensic profiles. CODIS employ 13 STR loci 
for identification [7]. Typically, a test is declared negative with exclusion at three or 
more loci [1].  
While STR provides a reliable technique for identifying criminal, it can also be 
misused for re-identification, infer ethnic origin, and also for disease detection [5] [9] 
[10]. It has been found that these attacks in practice can often be facilitated by the unique 
background knowledge of human genomes, i.e., the availability of a reference population 
that resembles case individuals.   
1.2 Kinship Testing 
Kinship testing is used to match human remains from disaster scenes to declared parents. 
In many big disasters, we need to identify the victims so as to further deal with the 
results. In cases that involve hundreds of victims, remains need to be claimed by their 
families. Due to severe damage to the remains, potential families could be a large pool. 
Besides of this, it is very useful to identify suspects without accessibility to their DNA 
sample but their parents’. Kinship testing could be conducted in two situations: both 
parents appear, and just one parent appears. 
(1)    Kinship testing with one parent 
In this case, we have access to the DNA profile of one potential parent. And we 
need to identify if a DNA sample from a crime scene is the potential child of this 
declared parent. Since a child inherits DNA from both parents evenly, there is a half 
matching between one parent and child. In reality, since sometimes mutations exist, it is 
4 
 
 
a standard practice to require exclusion on three or more loci before a test is declared 
negative [1]. We use ሺX୧ଵ, X୧ଶሻ and ሺY୧ଵ, Y୧ଶሻ, i ൌ 1,2,… , n to represent the DNA profile 
of a child and a potential parent, respectively, then we have if 
෍ሾሺX୧ଵ, X୧ଶሻ ת ሺY୧ଵ, Y୧ଶሻ ് ׎ሿ
N
୧ୀଵ
 ൒ N െ 2, 
then there is a significant probability that there is a kinship between the two given 
samples. 
(2)    Kinship testing with two parents  
In this case, we have access to a DNA profile from crime scene and DNA profiles 
of both declared parents. And we would like to confirm the kinship between the criminal 
and two referred parents. Since we have two DNA reference, we can argue that the test is 
positive only when the DNA profile matches both the mother and father evenly. Then we 
have if 
෍ሼሾX୧ଵ א ሺY୧ଵ, Y୧ଶሻሿ ת ሾX୧ଶ א ሺZ୧ଵ, Z୧ଶሻሿሽ
N
୧ୀଵ
 ൒ N െ 2, 
then there is a significant probability that the sample is a child of the potential parents. 
1.3 Identity Testing 
Identity testing is used for matching a suspect to the samples from the scene of crime.  In 
this case, we are able to obtain DNA sample from suspects directly. Some suspects may 
be innocent. If a suspect is convicted of the crime, his/her DNA profile will be loaded to 
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the DNA database for future reference.  Here, we use ሺS୧ଵ, S୧ଶሻ, i ൌ 1,2,… , n, to denote 
the DNA profile of a suspect. Then, if 
෍ሾሺX୧ଵ, X୧ଶሻ ൌ ሺS୧ଵ, S୧ଶሻሿ
N
୧ୀଵ
 ൒ N െ 2, 
for each locus, it is matched when two alleles are both equal to the reference. If totally at 
least N - 2 loci are matched, we say the suspect is the criminal with a significant 
probability.  
1.4 Protecting DNA Information 
DNA information is sensitive for public usage. Abused usage can lead to the disclosure 
of an individual’s characteristics, such as race and disease. There are two main problems 
for developing efficient and secure privacy-preserving DNA profile matching: (1) to 
protect the privacy of individuals, we want to extract related DNA profiles between 
user’s query and database; unrelated information cannot be revealed to each other. F. 
Bruekers [3] proposed a privacy-preserving STR matching scheme based on the privacy-
preserving set matching algorithm developed by M. Freedman [6]. Basically, they 
treated each DNA profile as a set with 13 pairs of allele values, and use Freedman’s 
algorithm to compare these sets. Results can be deduced from the difference between 
two profiles. However, Freedman’s algorithm also has high computing cost as the 
database grows big. Therefore, for database like CODIS, we need a better solution. (2) 
How to design efficient and secure protocols for DNA profile data matching? Suppose 
Alice sends a profile to Bob, they want to find the matching profiles without disclosing 
6 
 
 
one’s unmatched data to the other. This is the main technique for DNA based 
identification. 
In this paper, we provide an efficient privacy-preserving DNA profile searching 
system, which could quickly detect all related entries in the database with the query. The 
major contributions of this paper are: (1) Profiles in database are indexed with a 
matching probability biased tree; (2) A two-step profile matching scheme is designed, 
with each step filtering out large amount of unrelated entries; (3) a high-performance 
ECC-based privacy preserving matching engine is developed for set matching. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
RELATED WORK 
 
2.1 Existing DNA Databases 
In 1994, the US movement passed the DNA Identification Act which enables the 
establishment of the Combined DNA Index System. CODIS is funded by United States 
federal bureau of investigation (FBI). In essential, CODIS contains National DNA Index 
System (NDIS), State DNA Index System (SDIS) and Local DNA Index System (LDIS). 
Each sample in the database must include a laboratory identifier, a specimen identifier, 
and information to classify/review the integrity of the DNA record. The FBI selects 13 
STR loci for developing database. Totally, there are four segments in CODIS: 
? The forensic Index contains NDA profiles from crime scene samples 
? The offender Index contains DNA profiles of individuals convicted of certain 
crime 
? Unidentified human remains 
? Relatives of missing persons    
As of October 2009, the situation of CODIS is: 
? Total number of offender profiles: 6,300,000 
? Total number of forensic profiles: 241,000 
Currently all 50 states have mandatory DNA collection from certain felony offenses like  
sexual assault and homicide, and 47 states collect DNA from all convicted felons. The 
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American Civil Liberties Union worries about the increasing use of collecting DNA 
from arrested suspects.  
The UK National DNA database is established in 1995. NDNAD has mainly two 
segments: 
? profiles generated from scenes of crime (263,000 by 2005) 
? Profiles generated from individuals (3,450,000 by 2005) 
With large amount of profiles in NDNAD, there is currently a 45% chance to match a 
sample from scenes to the database. More ethical concerns have been raised since 75% 
of young black males aged from 15 to 34 are collected while 22% of young white people 
are collected.  
2.2 Performance vs. Privacy 
2.2.1 Search Time 
Search time is the time from starting a query to getting the results from DNA database 
server. According to [2], currently search performance of CODIS is approximately 5 
seconds with a database of 100,000 profiles. This means that a big national database of 
one billion profiles, such as China and India, will require 5,000 seconds. This is 
inacceptable for a real-time query. To speedup CODIS, a hierarchical database is 
proposed in [2]. It gathers similar DNA profiles, and deploys them onto different 
machines. A query is divided into n communication parts, with each part handled by a 
machine separately. A parallel virtual machine (PVM) based computing architecture is 
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designed to perform database search concurrently. However, there is still no 
performance evaluation for this idea.  
2.2.2 Related Cryptographic Techniques 
Most of the privacy-preserving genomic computation protocols rely on two 
cryptographic techniques: secure multi-party computation (SMC) and private set 
intersection (PSI). The idea of secure multi-party computation (SMC) was first proposed 
in [13] based on the solutions to the Millionaire’s Problem. A general solution for the 
problem of secure two-party computation was later presented in [14]. The idea of SMC 
was to enable a set of untrusting parties to compute certain common function based on 
their own private inputs. After a successful secure multi-party computation each party 
only knows the output from the function and does not know anything about other’s 
inputs.  
The building block of SMC is Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol [15]. It allows a 
receiver to choose one secret from any two secret generated by a sender without 
knowing the other one, while the sender cannot know which secret the receiver chose. 
The complexity to compute an OT for each bit of two parties’ message (e.g., genomic 
data sequences) and transfer the whole garbled circuits makes SMC hard to implement 
for real-world security applications. While privacy-preserving computation of edit 
distance for measurement of similarity between gene sequences was achieved in [16] 
based on SMC, even the optimized SMC cannot handle genome computations of a 
realistic scale [17]. A PSI protocol aims to compute the intersection of elements 
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provided by two parties (say Alice and Bob) without exposing other information. That is, 
if and only if Alice and Bob have matching elements, the equality of the matching 
elements should be computable by both parties.  
In the process, outsiders cannot infer any of the matching results. Alice cannot 
know unmatched elements of Bob, and vice versa. Like SMC protocols, previous work 
on PSI designs had O(n2) [6], where  n is the number of elements of two user’s sets. This 
is considered to be too high to be useable for real-world applications [18]. In addition, 
this is no existing implementation of using PSI protocols for complex string 
computations/comparisons like edit distance.  
2.2.3 Existing Privacy-preserving Genomic Computation Protocols  
[21] proposed the first protocol for privacy-preserving sequence comparisons such that 
one party reveals nothing about his private sequence to the other party. Their solution 
was extended to support privacy-preserving Smith-Waterman local nucleotide 
comparisons in [22]. Several more efficient secure genomic computation protocols were 
proposed in [16] that supported calculations of both edit distance and Smith-Waterman 
similarity scores between two sequences. The authors developed their protocols based on 
secure multi-party computation (SMC) [13][14] and evaluated their prototype by 
implementing it on sequences from the Pfam [23] database of protein families.  
The most recent privacy-preserving genomic computation framework [17] was 
based on program specialization. In their framework genomic data was categorized as 
sensitive data and public data. The partition allowed a concrete biology computation on 
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public data and a symbolic computation on sensitive data such that protection on 
sensitive genomic data was efficiently achieved. Another privacy-preserving matching 
protocol [3] was proposed to allow two parties to find their matching short tandem 
repeats (STRs) [24], which was the main technique for DNA based identification. Their 
solution was based on a private set intersection (PSI) [6] protocol so that two parties 
could find their matching STRs without disclosing the content s of their sequence to 
each other.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
PRIVACY PRESERVING OF FORENSIC DNA DATABASES 
 
3.1 Basics and Assumptions 
Usually the DNA data gathered for genetic forensics can be conveniently accessed by 
authorized agents to benefit the social security. However, such data dissemination needs 
to be considered with the protection of participants’ privacy. This becomes very 
important since unveiling of the gathered DNA data can cause serious consequence. For 
example, revealing the identity of a case individual usually relates him to the disease, 
which may cause denial of access to health/life insurance, education, and employment. 
Prior research shows that raw DNA data (genotypes) is often too risky to publish even 
after removal of explicit identifiers [25] (such as name, social security number, etc.) 
since recovery of a participant’s identity can be achieved through examining his genetic 
markers related to his observable features [26][27]. So aggregate genome data, such as 
allele frequencies (i.e., the frequencies of different SNP values) are usually displayed 
because such data covers an individual’s information with that of others and is thought 
to be of less sensitive. For example, the NHGRI/NIH used to make allele frequencies 
publicly available.  
However, some recent work [28][29] show that even public allele frequencies and 
test statistics can incur effective attacks to participants’ identities or SNP sequences. 
Homer et al. [29] found that the presence of an individual in a case group can be 
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determined from allele frequencies, given the assumption that the victim’s DNA profile 
has been acquired (from a single hair or a drop of blood). Another study [28] show that 
even the test statistics (e.g., p-value, r-squares) calculated from allele frequencies and 
published in HGS papers could facilitate attacks in some cases enough for identifying 
participants or recovering portions of their DNA sequences. Usually there are two types 
of common aggregated data, the allele frequencies for both individual SNPs and SNP 
pairs, and the test statistics derived from the frequencies. Such data is studied under two 
typical threats, identification attack and recovery attack. The former uses an individual’s 
DNA profile to determine his relation with an aggregate data-set [8][28][29][30]. The 
latter re-constructs individuals’ SNP sequences from test statistics. It has been found that 
these attacks in practice can often be facilitated by the unique background knowledge of 
human genomes, i.e., the availability of a reference population that resembles case 
individuals.  
In general, protecting privacy of individual DNA when the profile is public to any 
potential attackers does not appear realistic. Developing solutions that can support 
kinship/identity testing without releasing holder’s sensitive data (e.g., DNA profiles in 
CODIS and NDNAD) to others is perhaps one of the most important privacy challenges 
in forensic genetics. For this purpose researchers have developed some tools/solutions. 
Most of the solutions rely heavily on various cryptographic techniques. Despite their 
different degrees of success, it is well recognized that most existing solutions face 
challenges of poor system scalability, high computing costs, and inadequate security 
14 
 
 
protections [18][31]. In summary, there are two main problems for developing efficient 
and secure privacy-preserving DNA profile matching protocols.  
Problem 1: How to manage millions of DNA profiles to facilitate forensic query? 
Suppose Alice has ten million DNA profiles and wants to keep these data on a general 
computer she can afford. As we know, 10 million profiles will take up more than 1GB 
space. For a national DNA database, the number of profiles could be as big as one 
billion. Hence, instead of main memory, we have to put this data on hard disk, for which 
space is not a problem. To quickly locate a profile on the disk, we have to achieve the 
following goals: 
G(1): How to organize all this DNA profiles on hard disk, so that we can operate 
(search/add/remove/update) a profile efficiently? 
G(2):  How to design an efficient algorithm to find all the related profiles to the query? 
We will design a novel index tree to organize the massive DNA profiles based on the 
allele of each locus. Basically, since each locus has a different distribution of alleles, we 
propose a strategy to discriminate these loci wisely.  
Problem 2: How to design efficient and secure protocols for basic DNA profile 
matching? Suppose Alice and Bob each has a set of DNA profiles and they want to find 
the related profiles without disclosing one’s unrelated profiles to each other. This is the 
main technique for DNA based identification. Here we view each allele as a single 
element (unit). Then the privacy-preserving element matching protocol should satisfy the 
following requirements:  
15 
 
 
R(1): If and only if Alice and Bob have matching elements, the equality of the elements 
must be computable by both parties.  
R(2): Outsiders cannot infer any elements. Bob cannot know unmatched elements of 
Alice, and vice versa.  
We propose a new privacy-preserving element matching protocol to solve these 
technical challenges based on ECDLP [32] and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC)-based 
homomorphism [33]. More specifically, ECDLP guarantees protection of a party’s 
elements when they are associated with an ECC point (R(2)) and ECC-based 
homomorphism guarantees computability of encrypted elements (R(1)). For example, 
Alice can encrypt her elements by associating them with an elliptic point and send them 
to Bob. Based on ECC-based homomorphism, Bob can modify Alice’s encrypted 
elements using his own elements. After Alice receives the modified elements, she can 
perform equality check on the returned modified elements to find out the intersection as 
the matching elements. Compared with the existing work [3][6], the proposed protocol 
has linear computational and communication costs. We also evaluate the protocol by 
implementing it for matching of simulated DNA profiles.  
There are two types of attacks: 
? Semi-honest attacks: Attackers follow appropriate computation protocols, but want 
to gain others’ private information 
? Malicious attacks: Attackers can do anything to obtain private information of the 
other parties, e.g., do not honor agreements, send false information, involve in 
collaborations with other attackers. 
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Our paper is based on the following two assumptions: 
Assumption 1: to protect individual’s privacy, only related profiles between users 
and database could be learned by each other. 
Assumption 2: users are semi-honest. They will not break the rules in order to gain 
private information. Our protocol is designed to resist passive dictionary attacks 
launched by semi-honest adversary, but it is not designed to defend against active attacks, 
e.g., forging of attributes, traffic interception to block correlation.  
3.2 Output Formats 
There are generally two different kinds of results users want to get: (1) is my sample 
related to any of the profiles in DNA database? (2) If yes, what are the allele values of 
all the related profiles? For (1), the user has many samples from crime scene, and wants 
to know if which belongs to a potential criminal. They submit the samples to a reference 
database, e.g. CODIS, and just want to know yes or no. In doing so, right samples could 
be followed up. For example, after a disaster, we need to find the families of the victims. 
First, the government needs to obtain DNA samples for crime scene. Due to the severe 
destroy of disaster, many unrelated samples other than victims’ are extracted. First we 
need to filter out these noises. To do this, a query is initiated to a reference DNA 
database where the victims should appear. A good reference database might be a national 
DNA database like NDNAD, which contains most citizens’ samples. For the second 
output format, we would like to the extract content of related profiles, and use them for 
further analysis, e.g., compare them between each other to better identify the criminal.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DESIGNING PRIVACY-PRESERVING SYSTEM 
 
Population genetics is a study of factors affecting the allele and genotype frequencies of 
different genetic loci in a population. The Hardy-Weinberg law provides a simple 
mathematical representation of the relationship of genotype and allele frequencies within 
an ideal population. It states that within a randomly mating population the genotype 
frequencies at any single genetic locus remain constant [1]. To meet HW law, there are 
five preliminaries:  
? the population is infinitely large; 
If the population is limited, then the frequency of alleles [4] will change through a 
genetic drift process. In a small population, the effect of genetic drift is more 
significant. However, most countries and races have a large population which 
genetic drift could be ignored. 
? random mating occurs within the population;  
Since STR genotypes do not affect human’s phenotype, such as height, intelligence, 
or strength, selection of STR through mating is unlikely. 
? the population is free from the effects of migration; 
Human history is full of migration and this could affect allele frequency obviously. 
However, populations with different culture, language, religions are not likely to 
merge in a short term. 
? there is no natural selection; 
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The loci used for forensic genetics are not located within functionally important 
regions. Hence, they are unlikely facing the impact of natural selection. 
? no mutations occur.  
The mutation of STR loci are relatively low at less than 0.2% per generation and do 
not have oblivious effect on allele frequency. 
In [34], allele frequency of six groups of populations, including African Americans, 
U.S. Caucasians, Hispanics, Bahamians, Jamaicans, and Trinidadians are reported. The 
TPOX locus was the least discriminating locus for Caucasians and Hispanics, while 
D12S317 is the least discriminating one for African-based populations. Also, there is 
little departure from HW laws in any of the six populations. To characterize the allele of 
each population, at least one hundred individuals need to be collected. The larger the 
database, the more representative of the population it will be. 
From Table III [shown on page 41], we know that the allele distributions of 13 core 
loci are very diverse. For FGA, there are totally 16 different alleles, while 10 of them 
having a frequency larger than 1%. While for TH01, there are 6 alleles. And all of them 
appear bigger than 1%. To better represent this diversity, locus matching probability is 
proposed. We will show how to use MP to build our STR index tree for quick search.  
4.1 Database Organization 
The workflow of our system is as shown in Figure 2: (1) Firstly, we calculate allele 
distribution for each locus according to the entries in the database. To locate a profile 
efficiently, locus with lower matching probability is compared first. An STR index tree 
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is build based on the matching probability of locus. The resulting STR indexing strategy 
is stored at the coordinator of server; (2) Secondly, when a client initiates a query, its 
coordinator will request indexing strategy from server. After receiving the indexing 
strategy, the client will re-order its STR into as Sଵ, … , S୩ , … , SN; (3) Then, we start a 
progressive plain-text matching procedure, from Sଵ , Sଶ , …, to S୩ . For each round of 
matching, we record the total number of exclusion (number of different locus value), 
once the number exceed the threshold, we exclude all entries linked with S୩. (4) Finally, 
all candidates are further matched for the remaining loci, using privacy-preserving 
matching engine. Server’s coordinator access all the entries meet the criteria from disk 
and send them to the client.   
 
Fig. 2. System overview (PT represents Plain-Text, PP represents Privacy-Preserving) 
 
4.1.1 Matching Probability for Multi-locus DNA Profiles 
Sampling error, single bands and correlations within and between loci always exist. 
They bring uncertainty of matching probability between two random people in a 
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population. Traditional method use product rule to calculate the matching probability for 
multi-loci DNA profiles. Aspects of the product rule have been criticized by many 
authors. Krane [35] points out that there is a higher matching probability in a sub-
population than in a large population.  Since a small sub-population infer a high relative 
frequency. When matching probability is small, the effect of relative frequency is 
significant.  
Sampling error comes from experiment condition limit, or labor’s error. It is 
inevitable in many cases. Table I shows how sampling error would affect our result. For 
a profile with 7 loci, if we ignore two alleles, then the matching probability increases 
from 10-7 to 1.45×10-6. 
Table I — Matching probabilities for 7 loci samples 
 
Profile with 7 loci Matching probability 
original 10-7 
2 allele ignored 1.45×10-6 
3 allele ignored 5×10-6 
 
4.1.2 STR Index Tree 
As illustrated in Section 3.1, a real DNA database could contains billions of profiles, 
which will requires hundreds of Gera Bytes to store. Thus, it is not suitable to store this 
data all in RAM. An alternative is to store them in external disk which is usually big 
enough. The disadvantage of external disk lies in it is relatively slow to access, 20 times 
lower than RAM. For a 7200 rpm ATA hard disk, it will take 200 seconds to read 10GB 
data. If we want to search for a profile on disk, we need to scan half of the data on 
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average. To get rid of this pain, a better way is to organize the data with an index tree. 
Two basic requirements for the index tree are: (1) First, it could be put into memory for 
quick access. (2) Second, It indexes the location of each profile on disk, so as to find any 
profile quickly.  
We use locus as the nodes of the index tree. Basically, it is a  ݇-level tree, with each 
level representing the allele of one locus. The leaves point to the location of the disk 
block where the candidates are. The number of entries in the tree would be 
approximately ݌௞ , here ݌  is the expected fan-out of each node. For a 13-loci DNA 
database, ݇ ൌ 6, and ݌ ൌ 10. Hence the tree takes up 40MB space, which is totally fit to 
memory.   
4.2 PTME: Plain-text Element Matching Engine 
A DNA database usually contains millions of records. If we access every entry from the 
disk, it will induce a big overhead. Instead, we use an index tree to reduce the I/O cost. 
For a query,  
ሾ ሺXଵଵ, Xଵଶሻ, ሺXଶଵ, Xଶଶሻ, … , ሺXNଵ, XNଶሻ ሿ 
and a DNA database  
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ
ሾ ሺYଵଵ, Yଵଶሻ, ሺYଶଵ, Yଶଶሻ, … , ሺYNଵ, YNଶሻ ሿଵ
ሾ ሺYଵଵ, Yଵଶሻ, ሺYଶଵ, Yଶଶሻ, … , ሺYNଵ, YNଶሻ ሿଶ
.
.
.
ሾ ሺYଵଵ, Yଵଶሻ, ሺYଶଵ, Yଶଶሻ, … , ሺYNଵ, YNଶሻ ሿMۙ
ۖ
ۘ
ۖ
ۗ
 
Our goal is to find out all the entries which may be related to the query. This is measured 
by comparing two DNA profiles without leaking whole profiles between the client and 
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the server. First, for each locus, we calculate matching probability based on the allele 
value frequency in the database.  
ܯܲ ൌ ∑ ௜ܲ
ସ ൅ 4∑ ሺ ௜ܲ ௝ܲሻଶ
௡
௝வ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ    ( ௜ܲ: probability of allele value equals to i ) 
Particularly, for a N-loci database (N = 13 for CODIS), we first calculate ܯ ௫ܲ, x = 1, …, 
N, and then sort them ascendant. Suppose the ordered ܯ ௫ܲ  is as follows: 
൫ܯ ௜ܲ,ܯ ௝ܲ,ܯ ௞ܲ,, … ൯. Then we can generate the following index tree for all the entries as 
shown in Figure 3.  
                                                                   Lଵ    
      ቀY11_min,Y12_minቁ … ቀY11_max,Y12_maxቁ 
 
 
 
 
 
                         : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             L୩ 
 ቀYk1_min,Yk2_minቁ … ቀYk1_max,Yk2_maxቁ 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-           
 
 
                                                          … 
 
Fig. 3. Structure of STR index tree 
 
Plain-Text 
Element Matching 
Privacy-Preserving 
Element Matching 
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As described in Figure 4, for nodes in the tree, the keys are alleles of locus. And for each 
allele, it has a pointer links to its sub-trees. Each node also has an augment hash-table. 
Basically, key is allele, and value is a pointer to its child node. With the hash-table, 
constant time can be achieved to search on each level of the tree. 
 
Fig. 4. Structure of nodes 
 
4.3 PPME: Privacy-preserving Element Matching Engine 
A privacy-preserving matching engine (PPME) is developed for the set comparison of 
two DNA profiles. PPME use elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), which 
is immune from passive attacks (e.g., dictionary attack). Briefly, PPME is the first 
demonstration of crypto-based alert correlation which has the following key features: (1) 
linear running time, i.e., Oሺ݊ሻ, where n is the number of input attributes, (2) proven 
privacy protection, and (3) secure against passive (dictionary) attacks. Figure 5 describes 
the procedure of our Privacy-Preserving matching engine. Firstly, the client loads its last 
N – k alleles to its PPME module. At the same time, the PPME of server fetches the last 
N – k alleles of all candidates. Secondly, for each candidate, a privacy-preserving set 
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matching is performed for these alleles between the client and server. Based on the 
matching result, server will know which candidates meet the criteria to be related to the 
sample. Finally, server will send related profiles to user. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Privacy-preserving set matching procedure 
Figure 6 presents the protocol of Privacy-Preserving Set Matching. First Alice uses E to 
generate the ciphertexts E(A) = [E(a0), E(a1) ,…, E(an)] on the (hashed) input elements 
A, where each ciphertext E(ai) consists of two elliptic curve points as its “front” point 
and “back” point. The “front” points are produced by associating Alice’s chosen random 
numbers with base point P. The “back” points are produced by associating both the 
random numbers and Alice’s elements with her computed point QA, where Alice’s 
elements cannot be deduced because of ECDLP. Alice then sends E(A) to Bob. After 
receiving E(A), Bob uses M and his own elements B to produce M[B, E(A)], i.e., 
modification of E(A). The modification function M allows Bob to (1) associate both his 
own elements B and one chosen random number with the “front” points of E(A), and (2) 
associate the same random number with the “back” points of E(A).  
Again, Bob’s elements cannot be computed from the modified “back” points 
because of ECDLP. Then Bob sends his M[B, E(A)] back to Alice, who can use D to 
decrypt-and-then-evaluate the “front” and “back” points. After the decryption (i.e., 
eliminating the difference between the “front” points and “back” points caused by 
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Alice’s own secret number and random number) if a pair of “front” point and “back” 
point are equal, Alice and Bob have an identical (matched) element. Otherwise, their 
elements are different. Bob has symmetric operations as Alice and therefore will not be 
further repeated here. Details of the protocol are discussed as follows [20]. 
 
Fig. 6. Flowchart of the privacy-preserving element matching protocol 
 
Computation Complexity and Communication Complexity Analysis: We use the 
multiplications of large random numbers with ECC points to protect user’s elements 
from dictionary attacks, i.e., H1(ai) cannot be deduced from E(ai)b = [rA1H1(ai) + rA2]QA. 
In addition, I also use H1 on M[A, E(B)] and M[B, E(A)] such that Alice (or Bob) cannot 
further manipulate the received ciphertexts as ECC points. Otherwise, inside adversaries, 
e.g., Alice, could launch dictionary attack to try every possible values for elements to get 
an equivalent equation between H1[kA-1rA2-1M(ai)b] and M(bj)f. If n = m, both Alice and 
Bob need (4n + 6) (i.e., O(n)) point multiplications to compute the intersection: one 
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multiplication to associate secret number with the base point, (n + 2) multiplications to 
generate the ciphertexts (step 1), (2n + 2) multiplications to execute M on received 
ciphertexts (step 3), (n + 1) multiplications to execute D on the modified ciphertexts 
(step 5) for decryption. Table II presents the comparison of computing costs of Protocol 
I and the PSI protocols used in [3][6]. Here n denote the number of elements of both 
Alice and Bob, and L is the bit length of each input element (assume all elements have 
the same length). Through Table II we can find that compared to [3][6] our protocol has 
linear computation costs based on same security model and different cryptography 
fundamentals. 
Table II— Comparison between PPME and existing work 
 
 Freedman’s Method PPME 
Computation Cost O(n2) O(n)
Communication Cost O(n) O(n)
Security Analysis secure to passive attack secure to  passive attack 
 
4.4 Security Analysis 
Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserving Matching of DNA profiles 
1. User A sends the first k alleles to database S 
2. S use PTME to find candidates; and load them into memory 
3. S initiates PPME with A to match the latter N - k loci 
4. S sends all related profiles to A. 
 
27 
 
 
For the remaining N - k loci, we could not continue with the PTME strategy. Otherwise, 
whole content of unrelated profiles will be disclosed to each other. How to select an 
optimal N – k? It depends on two factors: first, the space should be big enough to avoid 
re-identification; Second, privacy-preserving matching on these N - k loci, should be 
finished in a reasonable time, e.g. several minute.  
In this process, 
? From the view point of A, it learned all related profiles in the database. 
? From the view point of B, it definitely learns the first k loci of A. For the latter N - k 
loci, it can guess A’s allele from the matched ones. In total, B cannot learn A unless 
A is related to at less one sample in the database. In other words, if A is unrelated to 
any profile in B, then the unmatched allele in latter N - k loci could not be guessed 
by B. Hence, the whole procedure is secure. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EVALUATION 
 
5.1 Database Simulation 
5.1.1 Single-race, Multiple-races  
To the best of our knowledge, due to security concern, there is no public human DNA 
database available. However, many researchers have summarized the characteristics of 
different DNA databases. One of these characteristics is allele distribution, which shows 
the stable allele frequency in each population. We decide to utilize the allele 
distributions for 13 STR loci published in [34] to generate our simulated database. 
Basically, our DNA database contains the characteristics of real population, i.e., allele 
distribution. And its size will be similar as real DNA database. As shown in [34], 
different populations/races have different allele distributions. For a multiple-population 
based database, we just need to get the size of each population, and then generate sub-
databases for each population according to their allele distribution. 
5.2 Index Tree Size vs. Disk Size 
In this section, we perform simulations to calculate the space taken by index tree and the 
database. In these simulations, we set k = 6, and change the size of the database. Since 
all profiles are stored on disk, we can tell that the space of disk grows linearly as the 
number of DNA profiles increased. For index tree, since the level equals to k and the fan 
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out is in the range of [6, 16], we can tell there is an upper bound for the space 
requirement. As shown in Figure 7, the maximum space taken by STR index tree is 
nearly 10MB. On the other hand, when the number of profiles in database rises to 1 
billion, 100 GB will be needed to hold all the profiles.   
5.3 Query Latency 
Query latency is the time to get all the related profiles for a query. It shows the 
responsiveness of the matching system to the user, with lower latency indicating better 
responsiveness. In these experiments, we measure the average query latency of all the 
successful queries at a given k. Particularly, time cost of PTME and PPME are analyzed 
respectively.  
To evaluate time complexity of PTME and PPME, we implemented a DNA profile 
generator to create one set of DNA profiles for database server on PC1 (Intel Core Dual 
2.00GHz, 2GB RAM) and a query from PC2 (Intel Xeon 2.40GHz, 2GB RAM). We 
change the number of profiles in database from 104 to 105, …, 109, and perform database 
query respectively.  
5.3.1 Phase I: PTME  
As the first phase of our system, the performance of PTME is critical. In this section, we 
shows the time required to search in STR index tree in order to find all candidate profiles, 
which will be used for phase II. Since STR index tree is in memory and it is basically a 
tree structure. The effectiveness of matching probability is evaluated. Figure 8 compares 
PTME with MP-unbiased method using query latency measured in seconds. Observe 
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that PTME has lower query latency than MP-unbiased index trees. One can get up to 1.8 
times faster query responses in PTME when compared to MP-unbiased index tree. 
Figure 8 also tells that the time to locate candidates grows logarithmically as the size of 
database increase. This is because as the database grows, more candidates exist in the 
index trees. Therefore, more search time is needed totally. 
 
Fig. 7. Space cost of index tree 
 
Fig. 8. Time cost of plain-text element matching engine 
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Fig. 9. Time cost of privacy-preserving element matching engine 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. The relationship between candidate number and PPME time cost 
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5.3.2 Phase II: PPME 
After we load all candidates into memory, we are able to evaluate the time cost for 
privacy-preserving matching between user’s samples and these candidates.  
We have implemented PPME with the public crypto library of MIRACL [11]. I 
chose G1 as an additive group of points on E: y2 = x3 + x, with the prime order q = 2159 
+ 217 + 1, and SHA-1 [12] is selected as H1.. Each experiment is repeated for ten times 
to get the average computing costs, and the results are presented in Figure 9 and Figure 
10. The computing cost grows linearly with the number of DNA profiles: 1 second is 
needed for matching of 100 profiles, while 72 seconds for matching of 10,000 profiles.  
5.4 Query Hit Rate 
A query is said to be successful if it results in at least one related profile hit. Total 
number of query-hits returned for a query started in the system can also be used as an 
end-to-end metric to compare different DNA databases. Figure 11 shows the comparison 
using this metric. As the size of the database grows, the system achieves higher number 
of query-hits, which climb up to 95% as at the size of 109, while a 107-scale database 
only guarantees a 8% query-hit rate. This infers that more related profiles can be 
discovered in a bigger database.  
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Fig. 11. Query hit rate 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Communication cost between user and database 
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5.5 Communication Cost 
We also measure the average communication cost of privacy-preserving profile 
matching between user and database, i.e., network bandwidth, at the database’s side in 
the system. A database’s bandwidth cost limits the number of incoming queries it can 
process concurrently. When a database is overloaded, the query of a user is delayed and 
added to an output queue of infinite length. For equal query rates, the database achieves 
smaller bandwidth cost would have less queue length at its users’ side. Figure 12 
compares the average bandwidth cost for different size of databases. It shows that the 
bandwidth requirement grows linearly with the number of candidates, based on the 
measurements made by Wireshark [19]. Observe that at the size of 109, the average 
bandwidth is less than 200 KB. It means 625 queries can be performed concurrently with 
a 1Gb Network Interface Card.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has proved a high-performance system for privacy-preserving DNA database 
forensics. We provide two key techniques related to DNA database query. The STR 
index tree aims at indexing the disk location of each DNA profile in the database. Locus 
matching probability is used to build a light-weight index tree. It groups DNA profiles 
based on allele. Moreover, we develop a privacy-preserving matching engine, which is 
used to find related profiles without leaking unrelated profiles between user and the 
database. The simulations have shown that PTME has faster query latency than MP-
unbiased method. PPME performs much better than previous methods in a million-scale 
database. The results will help the community to develop new techniques to cope with 
data security while trying to find related entries in the database, at large scale. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table III— Observed allele distributions (as %) for 13 STR loci in African American 
 
Alell
es 
D3S135
8 
VW
A 
FGA D8S
1179 
D21S1
1 
D18S5
1 
D5S81
8 
D13S317 D7S
820
CSF1PO TPO
X 
TH01 D16S
539 
6    0.3       8.6 11.0  
7       0.3  0.7 4.3 2.2 44.1  
8       5.0 3.6 17.4 8.6 36.8 18.6 3.6 
9    0.6   1.4 2.8 15.7 3.3 18.2 14.5 19.9
9.3            10.5 11.0
10 0.5  0.3 2.5  0.6 6.4 5.0 32.4 27.1 9.3 1.4 29.4
11  0.3  3.6  0.6 26.1 23.7 22.4 20.5 22.5  18.7
12 0.2   10.8  5.8 35.6 48.3 9.1 30 2.4  16.5
13 1.2 0.6  22.2  5.6 24.4 12.6 1.9 5.5   1.0 
14 12.1 6.7  33.3  6.4 0.6 3.6 0.5 0.7    
15 29.1 23.6  21.4  16.7  0.3      
16 30.7 26.9  4.4  18.9        
17 20 18.3  0.8  16.4        
18 5.5 13.6 0.8   13.1        
18.2   0.8           
19 0.5 7.2 5.3   7.8        
19.2   0.3           
20 0.2 2.8 7.2   5.6 0.3       
21   12.5   1.1        
22   22.5   0.6        
23   12.5           
24   18.6  0.3         
25   10   0.6        
26   3.6  0.3         
27   2.2  6.2         
28   1.7  21.5         
29   0.6  19.0         
29.2     0.3         
30   0.3  17.9         
>30   0.3  34.6         
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